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KILLER PARTY: PROPOSING CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR SOCIAL HOSTS WHO
SERVE ALCOHOL TO MINORS
MATTHEW C. HOUCHENS*

INTRODUCTION
Lynn Sue Charles died abruptly in the early hours of February 16, 1991. Just sixteen years old, she had consumed alcohol to
the point of extreme intoxication,1 fully three times the adult legal
limit.2 Had Lynn Sue Charles purchased the alcohol from a commercial vendor, her parents could have brought an action against
that vendor.' Illinois provides a cause of action under its Dram
Shop Act which, although limited, might have offered some recovery.4 Unfortunately, Lynn Sue Charles obtained the alcohol from
* J.D. Candidate, 1997.
1. Charles v. Seigfried, 623 N.E.2d 1021, 1022 (IM. App. Ct. 1993). In
Charles,the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court and recognized a
common law negligence action for automobile accident injuries caused by intoxicated minor driver, where the host has knowingly both (1) provided minors with alcohol to the point of intoxication and (2) allowed minors to leave
premises in motor vehicle. Id. at 1025.
2. Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ill. 1995). At the time of her
death, the decedent's blood-alcohol content was 0.299. Id. at 156. The legal
limit in Illinois for adults operating a motor vehicle is 0.100. 625 ILCS 5/11501 (1994).
3. 235 ILCS 5/6-21(a) (1992) provides that when a commercial vendor
"causes the intoxication" of a patron, he risks strict liability in tort should that
patron harm another. The relevant part of this section reads:
[elvery person who is injured within this State, in person or property,
by any intoxicated person has a right of action in his or her own name,
severally or jointly, against any person, licensed under the laws of this
State or of any other state to sell alcoholic liquor, who, by selling or
giving alcoholic liquor, within or without the territorial limits of this
State, causes the intoxication of such person.
Id.
4. Id. The statute reads in relevant part:
[f]or all causes of action involving persons injured, killed, or incurring
property damage after September 12, 1985, in no event shall the judgment or recovery for injury to the person or property of any person exceed $30,000 for each person incurring damages, and recovery under
this Act for loss of means of support resulting from the death or injury
of any person shall not exceed $40,000. Nothing in this Section bars
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the adult host at a friend's party.' Therefore, Illinois law barred
her parents from recovery. This is the approach which the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld in Charles v. Seigfried.'
Gary Robertson died in the late evening of October 29, 1989.
This eighteen year-old was given beer and straight grain alcohol7
at a party attended in part by underage drinkers.8 He drank until
he passed out, a condition doctors call alcoholic coma.9 Gary's
friends hauled his unconscious body from the party to his apartment and placed him in his bed." Gary never woke up on October
30, because he choked to death on his vomit." The court in Robertson v. Okraj denied Gary's parents recovery against the social
any person from making separate claims which, in the aggregate, exceed any one limit where such person incurs more than one type of
compensable damage, including personal injury, property damage, and
loss to means of support.
Id.

The Dram Shop Act imposes liability without fault (i.e., strict liability) and so
is partly penal in character. De Lude v. Rimek, 115 N.E.2d 561, 564 (IlM. App.
Ct. 1953). A plaintiff has a cause of action under the Dram Shop Act for a direct injury inflicted by an intoxicated person, or for an injury suffered in consequence of a person's intoxication. Cope v. Gepford, 61 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1945).
5. Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 155-56.
6. Id. at 157.
7. Robertson v. Okraj, 620 N.E.2d 612, 613-14 (IM.App. Ct. 1993). The
grain alcohol is commonly called "Ever Clear," and is sold with several warning labels on its packaging which indicate its great flammability and toxicity
(information on file with author). The liquor is 190 proof, or 95% alcohol by
volume. Id. Two small warning labels read as follows: first, "CAUTION: Extremely flammable, handle with care;" and second, "WARNING: Overconsumption may endanger your health." Id. A third very prominent warning is more comprehensive, stating: "CAUTION: Do not apply to open flame.
Keep away from fire, heat, and open flame - contents may ignite or explode.
Do not consume in excessive quantities. Not intended for consumption unless
mixed with non-alcoholic beverages." Id. The facts of the case are silent as to
whether Gary, the decedent, was aware of these warnings. Regardless, he
was drinking the alcohol unmixed, along with beer. Robertson, 620 N.E.2d at
614. This is a highly dangerous substance for anyone, let alone a minor who
is, by necessity due to his young age, somewhat inexperienced at consuming
alcohol. Typical straight vodka is mild by comparison, only 80 proof, or 40%
alcohol by volume. Smirnoff® vodka presents only the standard warning on
its label: "GOVERNMENT WARNING: (1) According to the Surgeon General,
women should not drink during pregnancy because of the risk of birth defects.
(2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages impairs your ability do drive a car or
operate machinery, and may cause health problems."
8. Robertson, 620 N.E.2d at 614.
9. Id.

10. Id. at 613-14.
11. Id. at 614. The court chose a more sanitized phrase to describe the
cause of death: aspiration of gastric contents. Id. The two phrases are synonyms, however.
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hosts for the same asserted public policy reasons as in Charles v.
Siegfried."
These two tragic cases represent a regrettable gap in current
Illinois tort law. Both of these minors bore the full consequences
of their inexperience in dealing with alcohol - they died. In a forum which generally recognizes the minor's incapability to cope
with certain adult responsibilities, the current bar on civil action
against social hosts in Illinois seems anomalous and untenable.
In 1889, Illinois adopted the common law view that providing
alcohol to a strong and able-bodied man who subsequently injured
himself was not negligence." Although attitudes about alcohol
have changed dramatically over the past century, this basic precept remains constant. 4 Illinois still fails to recognize a negligence
action for injuries which arise when a social host furnishes guests
with alcohol to the point of intoxication."
Surprisingly, even minors do not present an exception to this
rule. 6 Generally, minors are a protected class in criminal and civil
substantive law actions, subjected to different rules and held to
less demanding standards of behavior. 7 When a minor drinks and
becomes intoxicated at a private party, however, he alone is re-

12. See infra note 30 for a description of the traditional reasons for rejecting social host liability, on which the courts in both Robertson and Charles relied.
13. Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (I1. 1889).
14. See, e.g., Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 165.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also Estate of Ritchie v. Farrell, 572 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (holding no negligence action where social host furnished alcohol to
minor); Flory v. Weaver, 553 N.E.2d 105, 107 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (limiting liability to furnishing alcohol to the Dram Shop Act); Martin v. Palazzolo Produce Co., 497 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding no negligence for
giving a courtesy drink); Zamiar v. Linderman, 478 N.E.2d 534, 535 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (stating no negligence when "social host" supplies liquor); Heldt v.
Brei, 455 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding no negligence action
where social hosts permitted minor son to serve alcohol to minor friends).
17. At common law, a child of under seven years was entitled to an irrebuttable presumption of criminal incapacity, i.e., the inability to understand the
consequences of his actions in an adult fashion. BOYCE AND PERKINS, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 589'(7th ed., 1989). Over
age 14, minors were presumed to have criminal capacity. Id.

Children be-

tween ages seven and 14 had a rebuttable presumption of incapacity. Id. In
Illinois, 720 ILCS 5/6-1, entitled "Infancy," provides that "no person shall be
convicted of any [criminal] offense unless he had attained his 13th birthday at
the time the offense was committed." 720 ILCS 5/6-1 (1994).
In negligence actions, a majority of jurisdictions hold a child to a standard of
care which is "that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances" i.e., a peer standard. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 283A (1965).
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sponsible for his actions under Illinois law."
The Illinois legislature created a cause of action against licensed commercial vendors who cause the intoxication of a patron
who subsequently causes injury."' Vendors are strictly liable for
such injuries, but recovery caps limit the damage awards. 0 This
liability never existed at common law,2' and does not purport to extend beyond those in the business of selling alcohol.' Thus, since
dram shop legislation expresses no opinion about social host liability, it should not pre-empt recovery against social hosts under
common law negligence theory.
Actionable negligence arises from the breach of a duty which
proximately causes harm. 2 Violation of a statute can demonstrate
carelessness, or behavior which creates an unreasonable risk of
harm to others.' A social host violates a criminal statute when he
18. See Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 158-59 (stating that a social host is not liable under the Dram Shop Act).
19. See supra note 3 for the relevant language of 235 ILCS 5/6-21 (1992),
the 'Dram Shop Act.'
20. See supra note 4 for the relevant language of 235 ILCS 5/6-21 (1992).
21. Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 157-58; see also Fitzpatrick v. Carde Lounge,

Ltd., 602 N.E.2d 19, 21 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that commercial vendor
has no common law negligence liability for sale of liquor to minor).
22. See supra note 3 for text of 235 ILCS 5/6-21 ("any person, licensed ...to sell alcoholic liquor").
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291. (1965).

Another common

definition of negligence is "conduct which falls below the standard of care established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 31, at 169 (5th ed., 1984). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318

(1965) provides:
[If the actor permits a third person to use land.., he is, if present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the
third person as to prevent him ...from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the actor (a) knows
or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the third person,
and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
Id.
Illinois follows this precept, and some of these common law negligence
concepts have been codified. For example, the Illinois Premises Liability Act
establishes a duty that hosts exercise "reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them."
740 ILCS 130/2 (1994) (amended by Pub.Act 89-7, eff. Mar. 9, 1995).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285(a) (1965), which reads: "[t]he
standard of conduct of a reasonable man may be (a) established by a legislative enactment or administrative regulation which so provides... ." This rule
applies so long as the harm inflicted is of the type anticipated by the statute,
and the plaintiff is among the class intended to be protected by the statute.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) (stating when stan-
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knowingly serves alcohol to a minor at his residence.25 Such a social host should be liable for negligence.
Statistics show that minors are drinking in alarming numbers
despite legislation aimed at curtailing such behavior. In 1994, 156
Illinois drivers under the age of twenty-one died in traffic accidents.26 Thirty-five percent had been drinking, and twenty-nine
percent were legally drunk. 2' DUI arrests in 1994 of drivers under
age twenty decreased less than one percent from 1993.8 Illinois
must continue its efforts to further reduce the number of underage
alcohol-related traffic fatalities. One method is to cut off the supply of alcohol to minors at private parties. Tort liability against
dard of conduct defined by legislation or regulation will be adopted).
25. 235 ILCS 5/6-16 (1994). Section 6-16(b) of the Liquor Control Act prohibits a minor's consumption of alcohol at a social gathering, and its violation
constitutes a Class A misdemeanor. Section 6-16(c) reads:
Any person shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor where he or she
knowingly permits a gathering at a residence which he or she occupies
of two or more persons where any one or more of the persons is under
21 years of age and the following factors also apply: (1) the person occupying the residence knows that any such person under the age of 21 is
in possession of or is consuming any alcoholic beverage; and (2) the possession or consumption of the alcohol by the person under 21 is not otherwise permitted by this Act; and (3) the person occupying the residence
knows that the person under the age of 21 leaves the residence in an in-

toxicated condition.
Id. Thus, throughout this Comment, the term "minor" means a person under
21 years of age, unless otherwise indicated.
26. Telephone Interview with Greg Killion, Data Analyst, Illinois Department of Transportation (Oct. 31, 1995) [hereinafter "Killion"].
27. DISION OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ("IDOr), DRUNK DRIVING FACT SHEET [hereinafter "IDOT FACT
SHEET"] (1995); see also Killion, supra note 26. The National Safety Council
recently reported that the number of underage drivers killed nationally has
decreased between 1983 and 1993, perhaps as a result of increasingly severe
DUI laws. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS, 1995 EDITION 86
(1995). Between 1983 and 1993, alcohol-related traffic crashes resulting in
driver fatalities, with drivers aged 16 to 20, decreased from 29.7% of all fatalities to 16.2%, a relative decrease of 45%. Id. This decrease is much more
dramatic than the overall decrease for all age groups, which was 28%. Id.
In Illinois, the percentage of traffic fatalities involving alcohol has also

declined in recent years. The following statistics are the number of alcoholrelated traffic fatalities, expressed as a percentage of all traffic fatalities, by
year. The numbers in parentheses represent drivers of all ages, and the numbers without parentheses represent drivers under legal drinking age, 21: 1990
= 38% (42%); 1991 = 32% (43%); 1992 = 27% (38%); 1993 = 27% (37%); 1994 =
29% (37%). Killion, supra note 26. Note that while Illinois numbers for all

drivers have tracked the national numbers almost perfectly, the numbers for
underage drinkers in Illinois have been slightly higher than the national average, and was still quite high in 1994, at 29%. Id..
28. DUI 1994 FACT BOOK, ILLINOIS SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE H. RYAN,
1 (1995) [hereinafter "DUI FACT BOOK"].
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the social hosts who provide the alcohol will help deter this activity.
Part I of this Comment traces the role of minors in the history
of alcohol-related liability in Illinois, and provides background for
related topics in common law negligence. Part II discusses the
shortcomings of Illinois' present rule which completely bars civil
recovery, and provides an analysis of legal bases for allowing liability. Part III surveys the solutions of other states that have
adopted some form of social host liability. Finally, Part IV offers a
proposal for reforming the rule in Illinois.
A HISTORY OF MINORS AND ALCOHOL-RELATED NEGLIGENCE
When a social host provides alcohol to a minor who becomes
intoxicated and subsequently causes injury, Illinois does not recognize a negligence cause of action against the host. 9 This modern
rule finds its origin in an 1889 case, Cruse v. Aden.3" In Cruse, the
plaintiffs husband accepted two drinks of liquor from a friend,
Aden.3 Mr. Cruse allegedly became intoxicated, and while riding
home, his horse threw him and he died.2 The Illinois Supreme
Court refused to allow this cause of action for two reasons: first, at
common law, no liability arose from offering liquor to a strong and
able-bodied man;" and second, the court construed the Dram Shop
Act to be the exclusive remedy in alcohol-related liability cases."
Primarily, courts have embraced the notion that an adult's
choice to consume the alcohol was the proximate cause of any
harm resulting from intoxication. " Since adults are deemed responsible for their own actions, courts perceived the host's act of
merely providing the alcohol as too remote." However, the same
notions of personal responsibility did not, and do not, apply to minors. Although the Cruse court decided against social host liabilI.

29. Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 158 (111. 1995) (holding decisively

that there is no cause of action against social hosts who provide alcoholic beverages to another person, even if person is underage or is a minor).

30. 20 N.E. 73 (Ill. 1889). The Cruse court held that offering liquor to
'strong and able-bodied man' was not negligence because: (1) the choice to consume-not the offering-was the proximate cause of harm resulting from intoxication, and (2) Dram Shop Act was exclusive remedy for alcohol-related
liability. Id. at 74.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 73.
33. Id. at 74.
34. Id. at 74-75.
35. See Cunningham v. Brown, 174 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ill. 1961) (holding that
the drinking-not the furnishing-of the intoxicant was the proximate cause
of the intoxication and the resulting injury).
36. Id.
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ity, it never squarely faced the problem raised in Charles.7 Arguably, courts have improperly extended the rule stemming from
Cruse and its progeny to include minors, because Cruse only dealt
with adults and alcohol consumption.
A. History of Illinois Policy Toward Minors and Alcohol
When the court rendered the Cruse decision, it applied the
then current Dram Shop Act, enacted in 1874.38 The sixth section
of that Act imposed a penalty against "whoever shall sell or give
intoxicating liquor to any minor. " "' Over a century ago, Illinois
drew a distinction between minors and adults where consumption
of alcoholic beverages was concerned. 0 Since then, popular sentiment has prompted even stricter legislative measures aimed at reducing the harmful effects arising from minors' use of alcohol.
In 1934, the Illinois General Assembly passed the Liquor Control Act ("Liquor Act") which contained a section prohibiting distribution of alcohol to certain protected classes."' As originally en37. See Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 155-56 (involving a plaintiff seeking relief
against social host who caused her deceased minor daughter's intoxication
which resulted in her death).
38. Cruse, 20 N.E. at 75.
39. Id.
40. Id.
[According to assertions of appellant's counsel,] the plain intention of
section 6 [of the Dram Shop Act] is to protect minors, intoxicated persons, and habitual drunkards from either sales or gifts of intoxicating
liquors, not on the ground that the giver is a dram-shop keeper, but for
the protection of the minor, intoxicated person, and drunkard, and fam-

ily; and that section 9 is intended to provide a remedy for those who are
injured in person, property, or means of support by the conduct of others, be they dram-shop keepers or other persons. (emphasis added).
Id. An even earlier case discussing these matters is Johnson v. People, 83 Ill.
431 (1876). The Johnson court held that whether a person is, or is not, the
keeper of a dram-shop, he cannot sell intoxicating liquors to minors without
incurring the penalties prescribed by section 6 of the statute; and further held
that a person employed in making change for parties engaged in unlawfully
selling intoxicating liquors to minors may be convicted on indictment for selling it, on the ground he aided, abetted, and assisted in such sales. Id. at 436.
The Johnson court stated: "[i]t
is not necessary to now determine whether a
person would incur the penalty of this section by giving liquors as an act of
hospitality at his house, as that question is not before the court." Id. at 434.
Thus, although the Illinois Supreme Court passed judgment as to social gifts
of alcohol to able-bodied adults, even if already intoxicated, it did not rule as
to minors.
41. 1933-34 Mll.
Laws, 2nd Sp. Sess., p. 57, art. VI, § 12 (eff. Jan. 31, 1934),

amended by 1951 Ill. Laws, p. 1557, § 1 (eff. July 16, 1951) (modifying § 12);
1953 IM.Laws, p. 1182, § 1 (eff. July 13, 1953) (adding specific penalties); 1961
Ill. Laws, p. 2479, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 1961) (changing "minor" to "under the age of
21 years"); 1963 Ill.
Laws, p. 2529, § 1 (eff. Aug. 7, 1963) (extending criminal
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acted, this section read: "[n]o licensee shall sell, give or deliver alcoholic liquor to any minor, or to any intoxicated person or to any
person known to him to be an habitual drunkard, spendthrift or
insane, feeble-minded or distracted person." 2
The 1961 amendment to the Liquor Act raised the legal
drinking age to twenty-one years by substituting the phrase
"person under the age of 21 years" for "minor" in the statute.'3 Illinois backpedaled in 1973, lowering the age for legal sale, gift or
delivery of beer and wine to nineteen years." In addition, in order
to conform with new criminal penalties imposed under the Unified
Code of Corrections, the legislature declared that violation of the
Liquor Act was a Class B misdemeanor." The reduced drinking
age did not last, however, when the legislature reverted it back to
twenty-one in 1980.6 In 1986, violation of the Liquor Act became a
Class A misdemeanor.'7 Lastly, in 1990, Illinois allowed an affirmative defense to the charge of providing liquor to a minor; a
vendor may reasonably rely on adequate written evidence of age
and identity. 8

The 1990 amendment aside, the legislature has increased
penalties for offenses involving alcohol and minors. Recent stiff
penalties allow the suspension of driving privileges without a preliminary hearing when police catch minors in possession of alcohol

liability to those persons who lawfully obtain liquor then deliver it to a person
under age 21); 1972 Ill.
Laws, p. 1398, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1973) (removing specific

criminal penalties); 1973 Ill.
Laws, p. 85, art. VI, § 1 (eff. Oct. 1, 1973)
(lowering legal age for beer and wine to 19); 1973 Ill. Laws, p. 1871, § 1 (eff.
Oct. 1, 1973) (same, enforcement provision); 1974 Ill.
Laws, p. 1501, § 15 (eft.
March 4, 1975) (non-substantive revisions to resolve differences among various sections amended by more than one act of 78th Gen. Ass'y); 1979 IlM.
Laws, p. 1139, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1980) (raising legal age for beer and wine back
to 21); renumbered (as § 6-16) and amended by 1982 Ill. Laws, p. 603, Art. VI,
§ 2 (eff. July 13, 1982); amended by 1983 111. Laws, p. 4519, § 26 (eff. Sept. 23,
1983) (updating language from "known by him to be an habitual drunkard,
spendthrift, insane, mentally ill, mentally deficient... " to "known by him or
her to be under legal disability"); 1983 Ill.
Laws, p. 5444, § 1 (eff. July 1,
1984); 1984 IM. Laws, p. 1808, § 54 (eff. Sept. 11, 1984); 1985 111.Laws, p.
2407, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1986); 1986 Ill.
Laws, p. 3137, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1987)
(amending § 6-16 to add hotel proprietors); 1990 Ill. Laws, p. 1831, § 1 (eff.
Aug. 29, 1990) (adding affirmative defense of 'reasonable reliance' on false
identification).
42. 1933-34 Ill.
Laws 2d Spec. Sess., p. 57, art. VI, § 12.
43. 1961 111. Laws, p. 2479, § 1.
44. 1973 Ill. Laws, p. 85, art. VI, § 1.
45. 1972 111. Laws, p. 1398, § 1.
46. 1979 Ill. Laws, p. 1139, § 1.
47. 1985 fll. Laws, p. 2407, § 1.
48. 1990 IM.Laws, p. 1831, § 1.
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while driving. 49 Meanwhile, some authorities suggest that reme-

dies under the dram shop laws regarding intoxicated adults have
decreased significantly.' Thus, the legislature clearly intends to
distinguish minors from adults regarding the procurement and
consumption of alcohol.
B. Rationalefor DistinguishingMinors in Alcohol Statutes
Legislatures have long distinguished minors from adults
when drafting statutes. Every state in the union, as well as the
District of Columbia, has imposed "ages of consent" for at least one
of a variety of activities which include: engaging in sexual intercourse; using contraception; marrying with and without parental
consent; driving an automobile; voting; purchasing or possessing
tobacco or alcohol, etc.5
During the 1960's, young people aged eighteen to twenty-one
protested angrily for the right to vote, since males of that group
were being drafted in great numbers to serve in the Vietnam conflict. In 1971, they got their wish.52 The next logical complaint
was that these young soldiers could be sent off to die for their
49. 625 ILCS 5/11-502(f) (1994). This section reads:
[any driver, who is less than 21 years of age at the date of the offense
and who is convicted of violating subsection (a) of this Section or a
similar provision of a local ordinance, shall be subject to the loss of
driving privileges as provided in paragraph 13 of subsection (a) of Section 6-205 of this Code and paragraph 33 of subsection (a) of Section 6206 of this Code.
Id.

The relevant cross-referenced section of 625 ILCS 5/6-205(a) (1992) reads:
[tihe Secretary of State shall immediately revoke the license or permit
of any driver upon receiving a report of the driver's conviction of any of
the following offenses:.. .(13) [v]iolation of paragraph (a) of Section 11502 of this Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance if the driver
has been previously convicted of a violation of that Section or a similar
provision of a local ordinance and the driver was less than 21 years of
age at the time of the offense.
Id.

The relevant cross-referenced section of 625 ILCS 5/6-206(a) (1992) reads:
[tjhe Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the driving
privileges of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing of
the person's records or other sufficient evidence that the person: ... (33)
[hias as a driver, who was less than 21 years of age on the date of the offense, been convicted a first time of a violation of paragraph (a) of Section 11-502 of this Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance.
Id.
50. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Allen, Note, Illinois Dram Shop Reform: The Need
for a Sword, Not a Shield, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 215 (1994).

51. MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE LAwS 5-6 (Henry Wechsler ed., 1980).
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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country, but could not legally step up to the bar for a drink. In response to this apparent hypocrisy, twenty-nine states reduced the
minimum drinking age between 1970 and 1975. 53 The tide of
popular sentiment quickly turned, however, and by 1979 eight
states raised their legal drinking ages.'
The inchoate effects of alcohol consumption, with its attendant problems on minors, are difficult to isolate and examine.
More objective criteria, such as increases in alcohol-related traffic
accidents and fatalities, tend to show that a lower legal drinking
M
age is undesirable.5
Scientific studies of these variables led state
legislatures to examine, and ultimately reverse, their decisions to
lower their legal drinking ages.
For example, two social scientists studied the effects of Michigan's choice to lower its drinking age from twenty-one to eighteen
years old in 1972.'
The study estimated an additional 4600 alcohol-related accidents between 1972 and 1975.17 More alarming, at
least eighty-nine of these accidents resulted in the death of at least
one person.58
Another national study examined the relationship between
adolescent drinking behavior and drinking-age laws.5 The responses of a wide cross-section of youths, mostly ages fifteen to
eighteen, showed a consistent correlation. 0 High school sophomores, juniors and Seniors in states with a legal drinking age of
twenty-one were more likely to report that they abstained from alcohol use than their counterparts in states with lower legal
drinking ages. If and when they did use alcohol, they were less
likely to be heavy drinkers."1 Furthermore, the data showed that
higher drinking-age laws corresponded with lower degrees of peer
approval of drinking, less perceived peer drinking, less accessibility to alcohol and less frequent intoxication.62
The necessity of prohibiting minors from certain 'adult freedoms' is certainly subject to reasonable debate. Likewise, opinions
vary about the effectiveness of minimum-drinking-age laws on reducing alcoholism among America's youth. Nevertheless, objective
evidence tends to show that laws prohibiting minors from the pur53. MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE LAWS, supra note 51, at 2.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 161-63.
Id. at 174.
Id.
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chase, -possession and use of alcohol have a deterrent effect on
harmful behaviors such as juvenile drunk driving."3 This alone is a
strong justification for maintaining minors' protected class status
regarding alcoholic beverages. As a protected class, minors should
not be held to an adult standard of responsibility when drinking in
social situations.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT RULE IN ILLINOIS

Section A discusses the recent Illinois developments in social
host liability relating to minors. Section B first outlines the severity of drinking and driving in America. Section B next details the
positive effects of minimum drinking age laws in various jurisdictions. Section C enumerates the possible legal bases for social host
liability relating to minors.
A. Discussion of the Rule of Non-liability
In 1991, the Illinois Appellate Court abandoned the traditional approach and allowed a civil action against a social host in
Cravens v. Inman.' Cravens caused a rift in the Illinois appellate
jurisdictions on the subject of social host liability. Justice McMorrow rejected the traditional reasons for disallowing a common law
negligence claim for social host liability where a minor's intoxication caused injury: lack of proximate cause; and pre-emption by
legislative enactment.6 Her opinion established liability in the
limited factual setting where a social host both knowingly provides
alcohol to a minor to the point of intoxication, and allows the inebriated minor to leave the premises in a motor vehicle.6 The Illinois Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the question of whether
social host liability is precluded under these facts, but it soon
would."
On March 30, 1995, Chief Justice Bilandic delivered the Charles opinion which resolved the split among the appellate jurisdictions.6 Loyally following a long line of ancestral case law, the Illi63. Id.
64. 586 N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).

65. Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 157-59 (Ill. 1995) (stating that the

rationale underlying the common law rule is lack of proximate cause and also
discussing the Dram Shop Act). Charles is the most recent Illinois Supreme
Court decision considering this problem (and perhaps the first to answer it
conclusively) and renews these traditional arguments.
66. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 377-78.
67. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Charles holding which squarely addressed social host liability for the tortious acts
of intoxicated minor guests.
68. See Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 158 (holding that no liability for the sale or
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nois Supreme Court held that the General Assembly had "preempted the entire field of alcohol-related liability through its passage and continual amendment" of the dram shop statutes.69
Therefore, the court would not recognize a cause of action against
social hosts whose intoxicated guests commit tortious acts, regardless of the age of such guests." Thus, had Lynn Sue Charles managed to fool a bartender or other liquor salesman, her parents
could have brought suit against that vendor.7 Unfortunately, her
tragic loss will go completely uncompensated for the sole reason
that Illinois will not recognize an action for the same
intoxication
2
when a social host provides the liquor to a minor.1
The court envisioned a Pandora's Box lurking beneath this
cause of action.73 Critics fear that the many permutations which
could follow are all difficult to resolve.74 While these are reasongift of alcoholic beverages exists outside the Dram Shop Act).
69. Id. at 159.
70. Id.

71. See supra note 3 discussing the relevant text of 235 ILCS 5/6-21(a).
72. This significant "loophole" sends. a mixed signal to potential underage
drinkers. Illinois laws discourage minors from purchasing alcohol commercially, and possessing or transporting it. Yet by allowing minors to obtain alcohol with impunity in social settings, Illinois laws seem to encourage them to
drink there. Large parties at private residences would likely require many of
the guests to leave by automobile afterwards, since sleeping area is limited;
arguably, this policy particularly induces underage drunk driving.
73. Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 164. Pandora's box is defined as a "prolific
source of troubles." WEBSTER'S 9TH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 850 (9th

ed. 1983). Pandora was the central character of a tale in Greek mythology
who guarded a box which she was forbidden to open. When curiosity overcame her and she opened it, she unleashed a swarm of evils upon mankind.
74. Id. at 160-61. The court expressed various concerns about the potential
scope of liability, and reservations about opening the floodgates of litigation in
this genre. The legislature may be best equipped to answer questions such as:
[s]hould only injured third parties have a cause of action against a social
host, or should the intoxicated person have one too? Should an exception be created only for minors? If so, should we treat persons under
the legal drinking age of 21 as minors, or only those under the age of
18? Should minor or underage social hosts be liable for serving liquor to
their similarly situated friends? Should a social host be held liable only
when he or she knows that the intoxicated person will drink and drive,
or should the host be held liable for all types of alcohol-induced injuries?
What actions must a social host take to avoid liability where an intoxicated guest insists on driving home? Is calling a cab sufficient, or must
the police be notified?
Id. at 160.
Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court is empowered to make such decisions which are not contradictory to the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions. See
infra note 76, discussing the Alvis holding. Rather than allow an inequitable
result, the court should fashion an appropriate remedy for the facts at hand.
The court need not consider all these hypothetical situations; although they
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able concerns, they should not prevent the court from making a
just ruling based on the facts before it. Perhaps the legislature is,
as some argue, the proper arena for far-reaching policy decisions.
Nonetheless, when fairness and equity require an affirmative
change in the law, the court has been prepared to make it on
equally thorny issues.7" The court must work in tandem with the
General Assembly, at times examining judicial trends in other
states to arrive at a just and appropriate rule which will advance
the "health, safety and welfare of Illinois citizens."7 6
B. The Need for a Rule Adopting Liability
Drinking and driving is a severe problem in America, causing
massive death tolls and huge economic costs each year. Young
people, aged fifteen to twenty, are consistently over-represented
both in alcohol-related fatalities, and as drivers in alcohol-related
fatal crashes compared to older population groups. While minimum-drinking age laws (MDA's) have helped to lower the overall
numbers of alcohol-related fatalities, American youths continue to
die in droves on our highways. Because the current scheme is
lacking, Illinois must combat minors' illegal consumption of alcohol
and its devastating effects through new and different measures.

represent valid concerns, the court has correctly stated that they are for the
legislature to consider.

75. Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 169 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). The Justice recalls instances in which the court has pioneered new legal direction where the
legislature was moving too slowly, notably Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill.
1981) (holding that comparative negligence should replace contributory negligence bar to plaintiffs recovery). McMorrow noted the following rationale of
Alvis:
The rule of stare decisis is not 'so static that it deprives the court of all
power to develop the law. The maintenance of stability in our legal concepts does not and should not occupy a preeminent position over the
judiciary's obligation to reconsider legal rules that have become inequitable in light of the changing needs of our society.'
Charles,651 N.E.2d at 196 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
76. 235 ILCS 5/1-2 (1992), which reads:
This Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that the health, safety
and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be protected and
temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors shall be fostered
and promoted by sound and careful control and regulation of the
manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors.
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Severity of Drinking and DrivingProblem in America7

Statistics show that traffic crashes are the greatest single
cause of death for every age between five and thirty-three,"8 with
almost half of these fatalities are alcohol-related."' In 1994, 16,589
people died in alcohol-related traffic crashes."0 Although this is
one of the lowest recorded numbers in years, it still represents an
average of one alcohol-related traffic fatality every thirty-two minutes.8' About one million people in the United States suffered injuries in an alcohol-related crash in 1994: approximately one injury every thirty-three seconds.8 ' About two in five Americans will
be involved in an alcohol-related crash at some time in their lives."
The National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration estimated that these accidents cost America twelve billion dollars annually. '
More than forty percent of all fifteen to twenty year-old
deaths result from motor vehicle crashes, with forty percent of
those alcohol-related."
This amounted to an estimated 2639
deaths in 1992 alone.88 Despite a downward trend in alcohol77. Illinois statistics are comparable. In 1994, 44% of tested deceased driv-

ers had a blood alcohol content (BAC) level which indicated that they had
been drinking. Killion, supra note 26. Thirty-seven percent had a BAC of
0.10 or above (legally intoxicated levels). Killion, supra note 26. In 1994, 46%
(423 people) of all drivers who were involved in fatal crashes and tested for
BAC levels (911 drivers total) had been drinking, and 81% of that number
(approximately 38% of overall number, or 344 people) were legally intoxicated,
with a BAC of 0.10 or greater. Id.; see also IDOT FACT SHEET, supra note 27
for similar numbers. Although 16 to 24 year olds comprise only 16% of the

licensed drivers in*the state, they are involved in 33% of all fatal alcohol-

related crashes. IDOT FACT SHEET, supra not 27. Of the 358 drivers who
were involved in fatal crashes in 1994 and found to be legally intoxicated, 27%
were age 24 and under. Id. Over 35% of the fatally-injured drivers under age
21 who were tested for BAC were drinking prior to their crash. Twenty-nine
percent were legally intoxicated, with BAC levels at 0.10 or greater. Id.
Overall, an estimated 629 people were killed in alcohol-related crashes in Illinois in 1994, accounting for 45.2 percent of all traffic fatalities. DUI FACT
BOOK, supra note 28, at 1.
78. DUI FACT BOOK, supra note 28, at 1.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.; see also IDOT

FACT SHEET, supra note 27.
84. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION ("NHTSA"),
HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT 23 (1990).
85. DUI FACT BOOK, supra note 28, at 1.
86. NHTSA, ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT INTRAFFIC FATALITIES: 1992 5 (1994).
In 1993, 2571 persons aged 15 to 20 died in alcohol-related traffic crashes.
NHTSA, ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT IN TRAFFIC FATALITIES: 1993 3 (1995). One
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related crashes among young people, this age group continues to
be over-represented in fatalities, and as drivers in fatal crashes
where alcohol was a factor." Specifically, seventy-eight young
drivers out of 100,000 young licensed drivers died in crashes in
1988, with twenty-five alcohol-related fatalities.88 In the same
year, thirty-three drivers over twenty years of age out of 100,000
died in crashes, with eleven alcohol-related fatalities.89 Thus, well
over twice as many young drivers than older drivers die in both alcohol - and non-alcohol - related crashes.90

Congress recognized this problem and recently took action to
address it. In July 1995, Congress approved statutes designed to
effectively establish a national minimum drinking age of twentyone years. 91 These statutes penalize any state which fails to adopt
the uniform minimum drinking age by reducing its federal funding
thousand seven hundred and seventy four of those persons, or 24.9% of all
traffic fatalities aged 15 to 20, had BAC of 0.10 or greater, and thus were legally intoxicated. Id. In 1994, the numbers decreased slightly: 2574 persons
aged 15 to 20 died in alcohol related crashes; 1,728 (22.7% of fatalities aged 15
to 20) had BAC of 0.10 or greater. NHTSA, ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT IN
TRAFFIC FATALITIES: 1994 3 (1996). While relative percentages have decreased slightly, it should be noted that actual numbers of deaths have remained virtually the same.
One other statistic bears mentioning: fatal crash driver BAC distribution
by age group. See id. at 12. Overall, age-alcohol pattern is characterized by
"a rapid increase to a peak in the 21-24 age group, followed by a slower decrease," steadily declining to its lowest point for drivers aged 65 or older. Id.
at 11. Because drivers of age 15-20 can no longer legally purchase alcohol in
any state, statistics regarding that age group illustrate the effectiveness of
this deterrent. See infra note 92 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the federal statutes which established the national minimum drinking age.
Still, of 7957 total fatal crashes with drivers aged 15-20, 22.3% (1774) of these
drivers had consumed some alcohol, and 13.9% (1106) had BAC of 0.10 or
greater. Id. at 12.
While decreasing percentages of alcohol involvement are always encouraging, this number could still be improved. Any measures which help to further
restrict alcohol access to minors, without undue societal burden, should be
considered.
87. Brief for MADD, Amicus Curiae at appendix, Cravens v. Inman, 586
N.E.2d 367 (Il. App. Ct. 1991) (No. 90-1124).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Precisely 2.36 youthful drivers die (under 20) for every 1.00 older
than 20, with 2.27 youthful alcohol-related fatalities to every 1.00 older death.
Id.
91. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1995) (establishing 21 as national minimum

drinking age, and penalizing states which fail to comply by passing appropriate legislation); 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1995) (listing criteria for discretionary fund
allocation to alcohol-related traffic safety programs, one of which viewed favorably is a minimum drinking age of 21).
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for highway maintenance or traffic safety programs.' Currently,
all states and the District of Columbia enforce a minimum drinking age of twenty-one."
2. Positive Effects of Minimum DrinkingAge Laws
In an effort to address the tragic loss of life, legislatures have
enacted minimum drinking age laws, or MDA's. In Illinois - and
in every state in the Union, plus Washington, D.C." - no person
may legally drink before the age of twenty-one.95 Nationally, these
laws have had a very positive effect: MDA's reduced traffic fatalities involving drivers in affected age groups by thirteen percent."
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimates that these laws saved nearly 11,400 lives between 1975
and 1990, with over 1000 lives in each year since 1987.97
While these laws make it more difficult to purchase alcohol
from commercial vendors, they are powerless against private persons over age twenty-one who choose to provide alcohol to minors.
Therefore, legislatures also passed criminal statutes which make
the act of providing alcohol to minors a misdemeanor.' This apparently has not been much of a deterrent. According to a recent
study, adolescent drug use occurs primarily in three locations: at
home, in a friend's home, or in a car.99
MDA laws successfully reduced the number of alcohol-related
deaths among youth in America.9 ° Perhaps in response to these
tougher laws, young people have taken to consuming alcohol in
their homes and their friends' homes. Social hosts, who can legally
purchase alcohol and then provide it to their minor guests, risk
92. See supra note 92 for a discussion of the penalties for non-compliance
with the national minimum drinking age, 21 years.
93. DUI FACT BOOK, supra note 28, at 1.

94. See supra note 92, describing the statutes enacted on July 7, 1995,
which effectively establish a national minimum drinking age of 21 years; see
also DUI FACT BOOK, supra note 28, at 1.

95. 1985 fll. Laws, p. 2407, § 1. This is a recent update to § 6-21 Illinois
Liquor Control Act of 1934, which originally considered minors part of a pro-

tected class, set apart from competent adults. The statute prohibited sale of
alcohol to minors, feeble-minded persons, spendthrifts, and habitual drunkards. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for a more detailed legislative
history of the act.
96. Brief for MADD, Amicus Curiae at appendix, Cravens v. Inman, 586
N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (No. 90-1124).
97. Id.

98. See supra note 25 for the relevant language of the Illinois Liquor Control Act.
99. Brief for MADD, Amicus Curiae at appendix, Cravens v. Inman, 586
N.E.2d 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (No. 90-1124).
100. See generally MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE LAWS, supra note 51.
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only a misdemeanor charge if caught. 1 ' Either the Illinois General
Assembly or the Illinois Supreme Court should adopt a rule for
civil liability in tort for these social hosts to cut off this alcohol
supply line to minors.
Since the adoption of MDA laws, the number of alcoholrelated traffic fatalities in Illinois has decreased because the laws
make it more difficult for minors to obtain alcohol. If Illinois
adopts a rule of liability for social hosts who serve minors, that
rule would further deter such behavior and make it more difficult
for minors to obtain alcohol. The Illinois General Assembly or the
Illinois Supreme Court should adopt a rule because social host liability will decrease the number of alcohol-related traffic fatalities
among minors. 2
C. Legal Bases for Social Host Liability
Negligence can be shown in several ways. First, violation of a
statute is evidence of negligence in Illinois under certain conditions. An Illinois criminal statute prohibits the furnishing of alcohol to minors. Another statute creates a duty of care in premises
owners/occupiers for their guests in Illinois. Second, when one's
actions are unacceptably careless and result in harm, he is negligent. When applying any of these standards, one can conclude
that a social host is negligent if he provides alcohol to minors who
subsequently become intoxicated and cause harm to themselves or
others.
1. Statutory Duty
A person is negligent if he breaches a duty of care and proximately causes harm."' The law requires every person to act with a
certain minimum standard of care and failure to do so constitutes

101. See supra note 25 for the relevant statutory language of 235 ILCS 5/616.
102. Of course, alcohol-related traffic accidents are not the only harmful activities which flow from the mixing of alcohol and minors. This contention is
vividly demonstrated in one of the two cases listed in this Comment's introduction: the decedent in Robertson choked on his own vomit when he overconsumed alcohol. Robertson v. Okraj, 620 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1l. App. Ct.
1993). A rule for social host liability should not be limited to cases involving
intoxicated minors operating motor vehicles because there are many other
significant ways in which minors can be harmed by alcohol consumption. The
minimum drinking age law is intended to protect minors from all the harms
which can result from intoxication caused by irresponsible consumption of alcohol, by simply cutting off their supply.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
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negligence."M This minimum standard of care is measured objectively, adjudged against an imaginary reasonable person of ordinary prudence under similar circumstances."'5 In addition, one
who violates a statute is deemed to be acting contrary to the state's
expression of a minimum standard of care. Illinois courts will accept the violation of a statute as evidence of negligence under certain circumstances. Furthermore, a civil plaintiff may prove negligence by showing that the defendant violated a statute "'° which
resulted in injury"7 to a member of the class of persons intended to
104. Id.; see supra note 23 for a description of a common law negligence action based on breach of landowner's duty to exercise reasonable control over
other's conduct on his property.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). The "man of ordinary

prudence" was perhaps first set as the standard in ordinary negligence actions
in Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837), according to Prosser.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, at 174. This is an objective standard which re-

quires the actor to "do what such an ideal individual would be supposed to do
in his place." Id.
106. See supra note 24 for the relevant text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 285(a) (1965). Dean Prosser explains: [w]hen a statute provides that
under certain circumstances certain acts must be done or omitted, it may be
interpreted as fixing a standard for all members of the community, from
which it is negligence to deviate. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, at 220. "All
that the statute does is to establish a fixed standard by which the fact of negligence may be determined." Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543, 544 (Minn.
1889).
If an Illinois court finds that a violation of a statute is applicable, then
such violation is evidence of negligence. Illinois is thus a "mere inference"
state. Other jurisdictions accept applicable statute violations on stronger
standards such as rebuttable presumption of negligence or modified negligence per se.
107. In order to prevail, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. This concept has been in a
state of continual debate since the 1928 case of Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R.,
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Palsgrafpresented an unusual situation of an unforeseeable plaintiff. A passenger was running to catch defendant's train, and
when defendant's servant tried to assist the passenger aboard, defendant's
servant dislodged a nondescript package from beneath the passenger's arm,
which subsequently fell on the rails. Id. at 99. The package contained fireworks, and it exploded violently. Id. The concussion in some manner caused
some scales, situated many feet away, to fall and injure the plaintiff. Id.
Thus, although the defendant agent's clumsiness could foreseeably harm the
boarding passenger or the package, plaintiffs injuries were unforeseeable in
the extreme. Id.
Two preeminent judges delivered different opinions, which have led to
some complexity and confusion in the law of negligence. Judge Cardozo wrote
the majority opinion, which held that negligence was premised on a relationship between the parties, that of foreseeability of harm to the party injured in
fact. Id. at 100-01. Therefore, while the defendant's act might have been
negligence toward the boarding passenger, it was no breach of a duty to the
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be protected by the statute"'8 and the harm is of the kind which the
legislature intended to prevent.'0 9
When a social host provides alcohol to minors on premises
which he occupies, he violates two statutes in Illinois. First, the
Illinois Liquor Control Act prohibits social hosts from knowingly
permitting a minor's consumption of alcohol on his premises."O
Violation of this Act is a class A misdemeanor."' Second, the Illinois Premises Liability Act essentially codifies the common law,
creating a duty that hosts exercise "reasonable care under the circumstances regarding... acts done or omitted on [the premises]." 2
a. Criminal Penalty for Providing Alcohol to Minors
The Illinois General Assembly has spoken on the subject of
minors and alcohol through its Liquor Control Act, which obligates
social hosts to refrain from serving or even permitting the consumption of alcohol by minors."' Thus, social hosts have a statutorily defined duty, the breach of which ought to constitute negligence. Many areas of the law treat minors as a protected class,
deemed incapable of mature responsibility."' One such area is the
unforeseeably injured plaintiff. Id. at 101.

Judge Andrews espoused a

broader standard, contending that "[elvery one owes to the world at large a
duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety
of others." Id. at 103 (Andrews, J. dissenting). Thus, when one acts carelessly, he takes a risk that someone will be proximately harmed; Andrews
would call this a viable plaintiff. Id. Andrews' bare proximate cause standard
has proved too problematic to be workable. Nonetheless, courts have permitted recovery when the concept of duty is stretched to near its breaking point.
In all, the Palsgrafanalysis here is fairly straightforward. The intoxication of minors can be reasonably expected to cause harm, and common law
principles impose a duty of care for landowners not to allow their guests to
harm persons off the premises. Therefore, third persons are viable plaintiffs
to whom the host owes a duty if they are injured off the host's land as a result
of careless behavior of the host's guests.
108. See supra note 41 for citations to the early dram shop provisions. They
prohibited selling or providing alcohol to minors, a protected class.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965), which states that a

standard of conduct as defined by legislation or regulation will be adopted
when it's purpose was to protect "that interest against the kind of harm which
has resulted, and... against the particular hazard from which the harm results." Id.
110. 235 ILCS 5/6-16(c) (1994).
111. Id.
112. 740 ILCS 130/2 (1994).
113. 235 ILCS 5/6-16 (1994).

114. See supra note 17 for a description of the special treatment afforded to
minors charged with offenses at common law; and see supra note 51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the choices which minors are deemed at
law too immature to make on their own, such as marriage, voting, and the
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decision to consume alcohol. Illinois has MDA laws which revoke
the minor's discretion." 5 Thus, the legislature clearly intended to
protect minors as a specific class of persons who need protecting

from the dangers of alcohol consumption.
The typical fact pattern in these cases involves an intoxicated
minor who crashes his car, killing himself, a passenger, another
driver or a pedestrian."6 With its increasingly strict DUI laws, the
Illinois legislature clearly desires a reduction in alcohol-related
traffic fatalities."7 However, by passing MDA laws, legislators
seem to desire an even broader protection for minors." 8 Thus, if a
minor is injured or injures another as a proximate result of intoxication, the minor caused the type of harm which Illinois legislators
wished to prevent.
Therefore, Illinois had a good opportunity in Charles to allow
a negligence action based on violation of a statute."9 There, a social host fed Lynn Sue Charles drinks until she became extremely
intoxicated, and she died trying to drive home in her toxic stupor. 20 Lynn Sue Charles was sixteen at the time,1 and thus'a22
member of the class the Liquor Control Act intended to protect.
She died in an alcohol-related traffic accident, which is clearly a
type of harm the statute intended to prevent. 123 The social host
purchase of tobacco.
115. See supra note 46 for the modern Illinois statute which prohibits minors from consuming alcohol. The Liquor Control Act of 1934, as amended by
P.A. 81-212, established a uniform minimum drinking age of 21 in Illinois for
all alcoholic beverages.
116. See, e.g., Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 155-56 (Ill. 1995)
(sixteen year old girl died in car accident while intoxicated well in excess of
the legal limit).
117. See supra note 49 for the text of one such DUI statute and related provisions, which seek to reduce the number of alcohol-related traffic crashes.
118. See supra note 49 for some indication of the broad reach of MDA laws.
The minimum-drinking-age provision itself is silent as to the specific harms it
seeks to prevent.
119. Charles v. Seigfried, 623 N.E.2d 1021 (111. App. Ct. 1993); see supra
note 24 for the Restatement rule regarding violation of statute as evidence of
negligence.
120. See supra note 25 which demonstrates that this social host's serving
alcohol to a minor was a violation of the Liquor Control Act.
121. Minors in Illinois are those persons who have not yet had their 18th
birthday. 755 ILCS 5/11-1 (1992). But see supra note 25, defining and explaining "minor" as used in this Comment.
122. See supra note 25 for the excerpted text of the Illinois Liquor Control
Act.
123. See supra note 25 for the excerpted text of the Illinois Liquor Control
Act, particularly section 6-16(c)(3). This section criminalizes the act of allowing minors to consume alcohol at one's residence, provided that the occupant
knows that the minor will leave in an intoxicated situation. Id. This implies
legislative concern over the acts of these intoxicated minors, once they leave
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who provided the alcohol in violation of the statute clearly caused
Lynn Sue Charles' intoxication, which in turn caused the accident.'24 These are the elements of a negligence action in Illinois
based on a statutory violation.
b. Premises Liability
The social host's status as a landowner gives rise to the second statutory duty to refrain from serving alcohol to minors. The
privilege of landowners to use their land as they see fit is far from
absolute, and judges have limited landowners' rights when their
use of the land affects the interests of others.'25 Dean Prosser explained that a landowner's "possession and control of his land
gives him a power of control over the conduct of those whom he
allows to enter [upon] it, which he is required to exercise for the
protection of those outside."2
Illinois essentially codified this rule in its Premises Liability
Act, which places a duty upon hosts to exercise reasonable care regarding acts done on their land.2 7 The General Assembly left no
doubt about its intention to create a duty; they explicitly used the
word duty in the statute. 118 The scope of this duty appears very
broad, since it simply requires the reasonable care standard of
common law negligence.
Therefore, when a social host permits minors to consume alcohol on his property, he creates an unreasonable risk that such
minors will become intoxicated and cause injury to those outside
the premises. This is the type of harm the statute anticipates by
the statute (injury arising from negligent lack of control over one's
land),1 and affects the persons intended to be protected by the

the premises. Since one 'very common method of leaving such premises is
driving, and other Illinois statutes have imposed such heavy penalties on DUI
violations by minors, it seems clear that Illinois wants to prevent this behavior.
124. Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 155-56.
125. The clearest example in tort law is nuisance. One is subject to liability
for a private nuisance if:
his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable
under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or
for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1965).,

126. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 356 (4th Ed. 1971).
127. See supra note 23 describing the statutory duty created by Illinois'
Premises Liability Act.
128. 740 ILCS 130/2 (1994).
129. Id.
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statute (those persons outside the land).3 ' When a social host
permits minors to consume alcohol on his property, he violates the
Premises Liability Act by creating unreasonable risk of harm to
those outside the premises. Violation of this statute is, again, evidence of negligence.1"'
2. Common Law Negligence

The Illinois majority view that common law negligence will
not support a cause of action against social hosts who serve minors
is unsupported. Subsection a explains that the Dram Shop Act
does not pre-empt such a cause of action. Subsection b demonstrates that common law negligence is a proper vehicle for such a
legal action.
a. Pre-emption by Dram Shop Act is Untenable
Since a plaintiff can maintain a valid negligence action under
a violation of either statute above, statutory pre-emption by the
Dram Shop Act is the only legal justification for not allowing liability. In the absence of the Dram Shop Act and the "seemingly misplaced construction given to it by our courts,""' Illinois would recognize social host liability for harm resulting from the illegal
service of alcohol to minors."' Thus, the current Illinois rule barring civil liability is valid only if dram shop laws truly pre-empt
130. See supra note 23 describing the statutory duty, over both one's land,

and persons outside one's property, created by Illinois' Premises Liability Act.
131. See supra note 24 describing the relevant Restatement (2d) sections
which describe the function of legislation or regulation as a standard of conduct upon which negligence can be determined.
132. Brief for MADD, Amicus Curiae at 10, Cravens v. Inman, 586 N.E.2d
367 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (No. 90-1124). Cunningham v. Brown, 174 N.E.2d 153

(Ill. 1961), and the subsequent line of appellate cases gives a history of Illinois
courts' construction of the dram shop laws. The misconstruction to which Mr.
Mallen appears to be referring is that of statutory preemption. See Brief for
MADD, supra, at 10. Since the Dram Shop Act in no way purports to apply to
non-licensed private servers of alcohol, the only way to find a preemption in
this area is by negative implication. The line of argument becomes: Illinois
provided a statutory cause of action against dram shop owners/operators
when their customers become intoxicated and harmed third parties; generally,
at common law there was no such liability for the actions of others; therefore,
only by positive law can Illinois create such a cause of action against social
hosts (which the dram shop laws do not). Thus, no such cause of action exists.
This argument, like the argument for a dormant commerce clause in the U.S.
Constitution, requires rather twisted logic to accept. In any event, the argument fails unless the presumption is true that no such liability can be found
at common law.
133. See, e.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.
1959); Colligan v. Cousar, 187 N.E.2d 292 (111. App. Ct. 1963)
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such liability.
Illinois appellate courts came to an opposite conclusion on an
analogous area of law. In 1954, the First District, in Semeniuk v.
Chentis, "3 ruled that a city ordinance which prohibited the commercial selling of firearms to minors did not pre-empt liability for
negligent sales of firearms to minors.'35 The Semeniuk court explicitly held that no cause existed under the city ordinance, but
36
The
nevertheless, the seller could be liable for negligence.
OF
TORTS,
Semeniuk court looked to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
which provided that one acts negligently when he permits a third
person to use a thing or engage in an activity which is likely to
7
cause harm, if such thing or activity is within one's control." The
most obvious application of the rule, as stated in the comments, is
where "the third person is a member of a class which is notoriously
8
likely to misuse the thing which the actor permits him to use,"" as

App. Ct. 1954). The Chicago city ordinance dis134. 117 N.E.2d 883 (Ill.
cussed by both parties in Semeniuk, reads as follows:
§ 883. Firearms-Minors.-No person shall sell, loan or furnish to any
minor any gun, pistol or other firearm, or any toy gun, toy pistol or
other toy firearm in which any explosive substance can be used, within
the city, under a penalty of the more than $100 for each offense: Provided, that minors may be permitted, with consent of their parents or
guardians, to use firearms on the premises of a duly licensed shooting
gallery, gun club or rifle club, or to secure a permit to shoot game birds
in accordance with the provisions of section 1486 of chapter 39 of this
ordinance.
1914).
Hartnett v. Boston Store of Chicago, 106 N.E. 837, 838 (Ill.
135. Semeniuk, 117 N.E.2d at 886. Although Semeniuk has been distinguished by two modern cases, it remains good law. The cases - Linton v.
Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. App. 1984) and Riordan v. InternationalArmament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Ill. App. 1985) - merely limit
the holding to cases in which the misuse of the product is foreseeable. In
Semeniuk, this was the standard as well, but was obviously met because the
seller gave a firearm and ammunition to a seven-year-old child, who was obviously likely to misuse them. Semeniuk, 117 N.E.2d at 884.
136. Semeniuk, 117 N.E.2d at 886.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965). The authors state
that:
[i]t is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in
an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or
should know that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to
conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
Id. at cmt. b.
138. Id. The authors state that:
[tihe rule stated in this Section has its most frequent application where
the third person is a member of a class which is notoriously likely to
misuse the thing which the actor permits him to use. Thus, it is negligent to place loaded firearms or poisons within reach of young children
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when an actor places firearms or poison within reach of a child or
feeble-minded adult.139
The Illinois legislature has explicitly recognized that minors
are "member[s] of a class which is notoriously likely to misuse the
thing which the actor permits him to use,"' where the 'thing' is
alcohol, and the 'actor' is a social host in its Liquor Control Act. In
the Semeniuk case, the statute completely addressed the facts before the court, and the court still allowed an additional coextensive negligence action. 4 ' The dram shop acts only apply to
commercial sellers, and the facts before the court will involve a
private server of alcohol. 14 ' Here, there is a true gap in relief if the
courts do not allow a negligence remedy. Thus, there is a 'Wrong'
without a 'right.1 3 For these reasons, the argument stemming
from Cunningham that the Dram Shop Act pre-empts a negligence
action against social hosts who serve alcohol to minors is untenable and should be abandoned.'4 Therefore, plaintiffs should be
allowed to prove up negligence actions either by violation of statute as evidence of negligence, or general common law negligence
theory.
b.

Action Against Social Hosts is Valid Under Common Law
Negligence
Action against social hosts for the injuries caused by the inor feeble-minded adults.

Id.
139. See supra note 139 for the full text of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 308 cmt. b (1965). Comment b identifies the acts of placing firearms
or poison within reach of a child or feeble-minded adult as specific instances of
negligence, as defined by § 308. Id.
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965). See supra note 46
and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1980 amendment to the Liquor
Control Act. This raised the minimum drinking age to 21 for all alcoholic beverages.
141. Semeniuk, 117 N.E.2d at 886.
142. This strengthens the argument that Illinois should adopt a negligence
cause of action against social hosts, since the dram shop law is not really applicable to non-licensed private persons who provide alcohol to minors.
143. The Illinois Constitution purports to afford a remedy to every wrong in
§ 12 of the Bill of Rights, and reads: "[elvery person shall fimd a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person,
privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
144. See supra note 35 for a discussion of the Cunningham holding. Cunningham first established a firm rule against social host liability on the basis
that the drinker's consumption was the cause of the intoxication, not the
host's serving of the alcohol. Cunningham, 174 N.E.2d at 157. As discussed,
this rule seems less applicable where the drinker is a minor, deemed at law
incapable of mature discretion regarding the consumption of alcohol.
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toxication of their minor guests is valid under principles of common law negligence. A reasonable person of ordinary prudence
knows, or should know, that minors lack the judgment or discretion and knowledge or appreciation of the dangerous consequences
which can flow from the consumption of alcohol. This knowledge is
requisite to the mature evaluation process when one decides to
take a drink. Since minors lack this capacity, social hosts have a
duty to refrain from providing them with alcohol.
Obviously, when a social host serves alcohol to minors he
breaches this duty. A reasonable social host knows, or should
know, that the serving of alcohol to minors could result in intoxication. Intoxication, in turn, is likely to cause very serious harm to
the minor or third persons. Therefore, a social host should reasonably foresee that serious harm may result from providing alcohol to minors, and should refrain from doing so. Failure to observe
these minimum standards of reasonable behavior in a civilized society is negligence.
The eminent Learned Hand proposed a somewhat different
test involving, essentially, cost-benefit analysis.14"' Judge Hand
suggested a sliding scale measure of negligence based on three factors surrounding any activity: the probability of injury arising
from the activity; the extent or severity of the injury, should it occur; and the burden of avoiding the activity.146 If the burden imposed by avoiding the activity (i.e. the benefit derived from the activity) exceeded the probability and extent of harm (i.e. the
potential costs to society of maintaining the activity), then it was
not negligent to continue the activity. " 7 This test is particularly
useful because it not only provides a negligence measuring stick,
but suggests that the level of precautions required in a given activity be proportional to the level of risk involved in such activity. 148
Judge Learned Hand's analysis suggests that our social hosts
145. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
146. Id.

147. Id. Expressed as a formula: let burden = B; probability of injury = P;
and extent of harm/liability = L. If B > PL (that is, B exceeds P multiplied by
L), then the actor is not liable for continuing the potentially dangerous activity. Id. This is so because the burden of avoiding the activity exceeds the risk
in continuing. Likewise, if B < PL, the actor would be negligent to pursue
such an activity. Id. This is another way of defining reasonable behavior. Id.
One problem inherent in this approach is the lack of data on probability and
extent of harm before the fact, when they are helpful to an actor's decision to
cease or continue a potentially risky activity.
148. For example, the burden involved in avoiding certain risks in airline
travel has been drastically reduced in the past 50 years. Safety precautions
or devices which were either non-existent or prohibitively expensive then are
probably required by statute today.
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are negligent. The probability of injuries arising from the intoxication of minors is great, as demonstrated by the statistics earlier. 49 Furthermore, the severity of injury tends to be great: grave
bodily injury or death, in many cases." ° The burden on the host
consists merely of making reasonable inquiries into the age of
guests if alcohol is available. This burden is very slight when
compared to the gravity and frequency of injury arising from this
activity. Thus, a social host's failure to make reasonable inquiries
into the age of his guests when alcohol is available is actionable
negligence.
Many other jurisdictions have examined this problem, and
concluded that a cause of action was essential to justice. Illinois
should reconsider its policy in light of modern realities, and consider the solutions applied in these jurisdictions.
III. RECENT SOLUTIONS EMPLOYED IN OTHER STATES
At the time the Illinois Supreme Court decided Charles,
twenty-seven states had adopted some form of social host liability,
either by statute, '' judicial decisions, 52 or both. Thus, the recog149. See supra note 78 for a summary of Illinois drunk driving statistics.
The national counterparts are presented in the main text.
150. See Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 155 (Ill. 1995) (involving an
intoxicated minor who was killed in an auto accident after leaving a party
where a host provided alcohol).
151. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-128.5 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40
(1994); IDAHO CODE § 23-808 (1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 2501
(West 1988); MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (1990) (abrogating Holmquist v. Miller,
367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn.1985)); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-305 (1995), 27-1-710
(1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 .(Michie 1994); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
11-100 (McKinney 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.950 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §
32A-14-101 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1994).
152. Charles, 651 N.E.2d at 173. See, e.g., Martin v. Watts, 513 So. 2d 958
(Ala. 1987); Estate of Hernandez v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 866 P.2d 1330
(Ariz. 1994); Ely v. Murphy, 540 A.2d 54 (Conn. 1988); DiOssi v. Maroney, 548
A.2d 1361 (Del. 1988); Sutter v. Hutchings, 327 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1985); Slade
v. Smith's Management Corp., 808 P.2d 401 (Idaho 1991); Alegria v. Payonk,
619 P.2d 135 (Idaho 1980), superseded by IDAHO CODE § 23-808 (1995); Brattain v. Herron, 309 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Bauer v. Dann, 428
N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1988); Gresham v. Davenport, 537 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1989);
McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1986);
Longstreth v. Gensel, 377 N.W.2d 804 (Mich. 1985); Nehring v: LaCounte, 712
P.2d 1329 (Mont. 1986); Hickingbotham v. Burke, 662 A.2d 297 (N.H. 1995);
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984), limited by N.J. REV. STAT. §
2A:15-5.7 (1987); Batten v. Bobo, 528 A.2d 572 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986); Walker
v. Key, 686 P.2d 973 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Montgomery v. Orr, 498 N.Y.S.2d
968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); Hart v. Ivey, 420 S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1992); Mitseff v.
Wheeler, 526 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio 1988); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha
Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Or. 1971); Congini v. Portersville Valve
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nition of a cause of action brought by third persons against social
hosts was then a majority position among the several states.
These states discovered this cause of action under a handful of legal theories:'53 first, explicit language in the state's dram shop acts
or liquor control legislation;"M second, a lack of any bar or preemption by such legislation to a negligence action;" third, violaCo., 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983); Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301 (Vt. 1986); Hansen v. Friend, 824 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1992); Koback v. Crook, 366 N.W.2d 857
(Wis. 1985), superseded by WIs. STAT. § 125.035 (1985) (providing that "[a]
person is immune from civil liability arising out of the act of procuring alcohol
beverages for or selling, dispensing or giving away alcohol beverages to another person" unless such person knowingly furnished alcohol to a minor).
153. Some of these categories are not legally distinct. The distinctions are
drawn only to help clarify the approaches adopted in each state's leading
opinions. The differences may be purely linguistic, but since the opinions are
in many cases very new, their ultimate significance is largely unknown.
154. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-101 (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
12-46-112.5, 12-47-128.5 (West 1991); Martin v. Watts, 513 So. 2d 958, 963
(Ala. 1987) (holding that Dram Shop Act creates a civil remedy against those
who provide another person with alcoholic beverages, causing intoxication
injuring the plaintiff); Sutter v. Hutchings, 327 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1985) (holding
that social hostess who furnished alcohol to noticeably intoxicated person under legal drinking age, knowing that such person would soon be driving his
car, could be liable in tort to a third person injured by negligence of intoxicated driver); Forrest v. Lorrigan, 833 P.2d 873 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that social host is not liable for injury to third person because of intoxication
of guest except when social host "willfully and knowingly served" alcohol to
guest who was under age of 21 years). In Martin v. Watts, the providing of
alcoholic beverages to minors was prohibited by law, and therefore the statute
applied. Martin, 513 So. 2d at 963. The Forrest rule is stated in the negative
and appears to allow liability only under very limited circumstances. The
Forrest court held that providing premises for minors to consume alcohol is
not enough unless the host purchased or otherwise furnished the alcohol (i.e.,
knowledge alone insufficient). Id.
155. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (1990) (stating that nothing in dram shop
laws prohibits a common law negligence claim against social hosts (over age
21) who knowingly provide or furnish alcoholic beverages to persons under
age 21). This abrogates Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985),
which stated unequivocally that no common-law cause of action can be
brought against a social host for negligently serving alcohol to a guest who
subsequently injures a third party. See also Hickingbotham v. Burke, 662
A.2d 297, 301 (N.H. 1995) (holding that New Hampshire's Dram Shop Act did
not grant statutory cause of action against, social host, but did not bar or preempt personal injury action based on host's recklessness); Hernandez v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 866 P.2d 1330, 1338 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that although
statute immunized from liability those social hosts (not licensed by state as
dram shops) who furnish or serve alcohol to person of legal drinking age,
granted no such immunity when non-licensee furnishes liquor to underage
person); Slade v. Smith's Management Corp., 808 P.2d 401, 414 (Idaho 1991)
(holding that statute which limited dram shop and social host liability did not
curtail right to file action for furnishing alcoholic beverages to underage person where such consumption caused harm), superseded by IDAHO CODE § 23-
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808 (1995); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658, 660 (Iowa 1988) (holding that
amendment to liquor statute which clarified that consumption of alcohol
rather than serving was proximate cause of injury inflicted on another by intoxicated person did not apply to statute prohibiting furnishing alcohol to minor); Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Vt. 1986) (holding that Dram
Shop Act, which provided cause of action and strict liability to third persons
injured by inebriates, did not pre-empt remedy under common law for social
guest himself injured on third party's premises after becoming intoxicated);
Hopkins v. Sovereign Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 626 So. 2d 880 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that dramshop law providing that consumption of alcohol, rather
than sale or serving of alcohol, is proximate cause of any injury occurring off
premises does not relieve [alcohol provider] of liability to minors and third
parties injured by minors resulting from minor's intoxicated acts); Walker v.
Key, 686 P.2d 973, 976-77 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that dram shop statute does not bar claim of third parties harmed by conduct of minor where
hosts of party allegedly furnished alcoholic beverages to such minor).
New Hampshire went on in Hickingbotham to require that the social host
be reckless before assessing liability. Hickingbotham, 662 A.2d. at 301. The
Hickingbotham court stated that a host's service would be reckless if the host
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of a high degree of
danger. Id. at 301. The risk which "the host disregards must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of host's conduct
and the circumstances known to [the actor] its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe
in the actors's situation." Id. at 301. A simple summary of Arizona's rule in
Hernandez is that a plaintiff can maintain action for damages against nonlicensee who negligently furnishes alcohol to those under the legal drinking
age when that act is the proximate cause of injury to a third person (plaintiff).
Hernandez, 866 P.2d at 1342.
Iowa explicitly held that its Dramshop Act does not pre-empt common-law
action against defendant unless particular defendant is one covered by dramshop statute as licensee or permittee; thus, the act does not pre-empt common-law claim against social hosts. Bauer, 428 N.W.2d at 660-61. Also, an
Iowa statute providing that no person shall "sell, give, or otherwise supply"
liquor or beer to person under legal age applied to social hosts supplying alcohol to minor in home. Id. at 661.
In an earlier case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the sale of alcoholic
beverages by licensed vendor of such beverages to "actually, apparently and
obviously intoxicated" person known to be minor can be the proximate cause
of damage resulting to third person from subsequent negligent operation of
automobile by such intoxicated minor. Alegria v. Payonk, 619 P.2d 135, 139
(Idaho 1980), superseded by IDAHO CODE § 23-808 (1995) (providing that "itis
not the furnishing of alcoholic beverages that is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons" and limiting dram shop and social host
liability, with some exceptions, notably where alcohol is knowingly provided to
minor). In the Langle case, Vermont's Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that it disagreed with the leading case opposing social host liability in
Illinois, Cunningham v. Brown, 174 N.E.2d 153 (Ill.
1961). The Cunningham
court held that a legal duty of care in furnishing alcoholic beverages is not imposed on social host, absent situation in which social host furnishes alcoholic
beverages to one visibly intoxicated and it is foreseeable to host that guest will
thereafter drive automobile, or in which social host furnishes alcoholic beverages to minor [emphasis added].
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tion of
as evidence of negligence (either per se," prima
facie, 157 statutes
or mere circumstantial
evidence"); and fourth, common

Louisiana went on to hold in Hopkins that a minor's purchase of alcohol
and subsequent transfer of that alcohol to other minors, who were involved in
automobile accident, did not immunize liquor store owners, under dram shop
law, from liability for that accident. Hopkins, 626 So. 2d at 885. Furthermore, given the volume and variety of alcohol purchased, cold and ready to
drink, by minor in a short period of time, accompanied by other minors, the
owners could not claim to lack knowledge. Hopkins, 626 So. 2d at 885-86. See
also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.1.B (1991 & Supp. 1993) (dram shop law).
156. See Slade, 808 P.2d at 408 (holding that violation of statute in Idaho is
negligence per se, conclusively establishing duty and breach, leaving just
plaintiffs requirement to show proximate cause to establish liability, per
IDAHO CODE § 23-808 (1986)); Koback v. Crook, 366 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Wis.
1985) (holding that statutory prohibitions against selling to minors also apply
to allow finding of negligence per se in respect to furnishing of fermented
malt beverages and intoxicating liquors to a minor by social hosts; social host
who negligently serves or furnishes intoxicating beverages to minor guest,
and intoxicants cause minor to be intoxicated or cause minor's driving ability
to be impaired, shall be liable to third persons in proportion that negligence in
furnishing beverage to minor was a substantial factor in causing accident or
injuries), accord WIS. STAT. § 125.035 (1985); Congini, 470 A.2d 515, 518
(Penn. 1983) (holding that host was negligent per se in serving alcohol to point
of intoxication to person less than 21 years of age and could be held liable for
injuries proximately resulting from underaged's intoxication); Brattain, 309
N.E.2d 150, 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that any person, including social
provider, who violates statute prohibiting giving liquor to minor can be liable
for negligence; violation of statute is negligence per se).
157. See Longstreth v. Gensel, 377 N.W.2d 804, 808-09 (Mich. 1985)
(construing the statute, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 436.33 (West 1978),
amended by P.A. 122, § 1 (1995)). The Longstreth court stated that the statute which prohibits a person from furnishing liquor to person under 21 years
of age was not intended to apply only to licensed commercial sellers, but was
intended to govern entire regulation of liquor within Michigan, was penal in
nature, and was prima facie evidence of negligence if violated). Longstreth,
377 N.W.2d at 808. The dram shop provision of the Liquor Control Act,
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 436.22, was not the exclusive remedy against social
hosts for death of a minor allegedly caused by the hosts' furnishing liquor to
the minor in violation of § 436.33. Id. at 809. This was because the dram
shop provision-§ 436.22-applies to licensees, but § 436.33 is not restricted
to regulation of licensees. Id.
In Longstreth, the minor who allegedly received liquor from social hosts of
wedding reception and who subsequently died in an automobile accident was
the type of person intended to be protected by, and suffered the kind of harm
meant to be protected against § 436.33 of the Liquor Control Act. Longstreth,
377 N.W.2d at 812-13. This section prohibits furnishing liquor to minors, and
thus, survivors of minors could maintain a negligence action against social
hosts based its violation. Id. at 813. See infra note 188 demonstrating that
Illinois views violation of statute in the same manner under similar circumstances. A Michigan appellate court has questioned Longstreth's validity,
since the provision which Longstreth construed has been amended. Arbelius
v. Poletti, 469 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
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law duty analysis. 5 9
158. See Hickingbotham, 662 A.2d at 302 (holding that in context of action
against social host based on reckless service of alcohol, minority of drinking
guest is merely factor to be considered by finder of fact when it determines
whether host's conduct was reckless, although fact that statute makes it
crime to serve alcohol to minors is relevant to such determination); Hansen v.
Friend, 824 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1992) (holding that statute making a criminal act
of 'any person" to furnish liquor to a minor imposes duty of care on social
hosts not to serve liquor to minors, and that if social host breaches such duty,
trier of fact may consider breach as evidence of negligence, rather than as
negligence per se); Nehring v. LaCounte, 712 P.2d 1329, 1333-35 (Mont. 1985)
(holding that violation of statute is evidence of negligence, and that person's
consumption of liquor, operation of a vehicle, and collision with third person,
are foreseeable intervening acts, which do not relieve the provider of the liquor of liability for his negligence in serving the liquor); Montgomery v. Orr,
498 N.Y.S.2d 968, 973 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1986) (holding that violation of statute is
some evidence of negligence, but not negligence as a matter of law ('per se'),
and that minor by reason of his or her immaturity is not "able-bodied" within
meaning of general rule at common law excluding liability for procurement of
intoxicating liquor for ordinary "able-bodied" people).
When one reads Montana's Nehring opinion together with MONT. CODE
ANN. § 16-6-305 (1995), one can surmise Montana's social host rule. The relevant text of the statute reads:
(b) [a] parent, guardian, or other person may not knowingly sell or otherwise provide an alcoholic beverage in an intoxicating quantity to a
person under 21 years of age. (c) For the purposes of this section,
"intoxicating quantity" means a quantity of an alcoholic beverage that is
sufficient to produce: (i) a blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration
in excess of 0.05; or (ii) substantial or visible mental or physical impairment. (2) Any person is guilty of a misdemeanor who: (a) invites a
person under the age of 21 years into a public place where an alcoholic
beverage is sold and treats, gives, or purchases an alcoholic beverage for
the person; (b) permits the person in a public place where an alcoholic
beverage is sold to treat, give, or purchase alcoholic beverages for him;
or (c) holds out the person to be 21 years of age or older to the owner of
the establishment or his or her employee or employees.
Id. New York's lower court went on to summarize its rule on social hosts in
Montgomery stating that: an injured third party can bring action in commonlaw negligence for injuries shown to be causally connected to breach of statute
which criminalizes giving alcohol to person under 21 years old. Montgomery,
498 N.Y.S.2d at 973-74 (referring to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.20(4) (McKinney
1989 & Supp. 1992)).
159. See Hart v. Ivey, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177-78 (N.C. 1992) (holding that statute forbidding sales or gifts of alcohol to those under 21 years of age is not
'public safety statute" and, therefore, violation of statute is not negligence per
se; statute was intended to stop underage persons from drinking alcoholic
beverages, not to protect drivingpublic but automobile accident victim stated
cognizable common-law negligence claim against social hosts for serving alcoholic beverages to person whom they knew or should have known was under
the influence of alcohol and who would shortly thereafter drive automobile;
persons of ordinary prudence would have known that injury was reasonably
foreseeable result of negligent conduct); DiOssi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361,
1367 (Del. 1988) (holding that social hosts' failure to take reasonable steps to
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A. Statutory Cause of Action
Some state supreme courts examined their liquor control legislation and found a viable cause of action from the language."6
Alabama's Supreme Court, for example, joined what it deemed a
trend in recent decisions of other jurisdictions by discovering a

safeguard against indulgence by minors in alcoholic beverages and operation
of motor vehicles by such minors in impaired condition would be actionable
negligence; voluntary consumption by minors not sufficient intervening cause;
duty of property owners to business visitor was heightened by known risk of
underage drinking on premises); Misteff v. Wheeler, 526 N.E.2d 798, 802
(Ohio 1988) (holding that social host has duty to refrain from furnishing alcohol to minor and may be civilly liable for damages to third person injured in
automobile accident involving minor if such duty is violated); McGuiggan v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1986) (holding that
social host who knows or should know that guest is drunk and nonetheless
serves or permits guest to take alcoholic drink would be liable to persons injured by that guest's negligent operation of motor vehicle); Wiener v. Gamma
Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18, 22-23 (Or. 1971)
(holding that circumstances may exist under which person could be held liable
for allowing another to become dangerously intoxicated, i.e. complaint stated
cause of action against fraternity for injuries suffered by passenger in accident while automobile was being driven by minor on theory that the fraternity
ought to have known that driver, a guest at fraternity's party, was a minor
and that he would be driving after the party so that its serving alcohol to the
driver was unreasonable, per OR. REV. STAT. § 471.410(2) (19??)); Kelly v.
Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1224 (N.J. 1984) (holding that host who serves liquor
to an adult social guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will
thereafter be operating a motor vehicle, is liable for injuries inflicted on a
third party as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the
adult guest if the negligence is caused by the intoxication); Batten v. Bobo,
528 A.2d 572, 573 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding intoxicated minor guest can
maintain cause of action against social host who provided cause of intoxication).
The Kelly holding is quite broad in scope, and was very controversial. See,
e.g., Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (disagreeing with
reasoning); Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, Inc., 520 A.2d 1115 (Md. Ct.
App. 1987) (declining to follow); Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla.
1987) (same); Gariup Const. Co., Inc. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. 1988)
(same); Overbaugh v. McCutcheon, 396 S.E.2d 153 (W. Va. 1990) (same); Graff
v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1993) (same). The N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:15-5.7
(1987) limited the broad duty which Kelly imposed on social hosts. Now, a
social host "could only be liable to intoxicated guests who were minors or third
persons who were injured in automobile accident with an intoxicated guest."
See Componile v. Maybee, 641 A.2d 1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994)
(construing N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:15-5.7, which reads: "[n]o social host shall be
held liable to a person who has attained the legal age to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages for damages suffered as a result of the social host's
negligent provision of alcoholic beverages to that person.")
160. See supra note 156 for a list of states who found civil causes of action
from the statutory language itself, and summarizing their holdings.
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civil action against those who provide alcohol to minors."' Alabama's dram shop law establishes liability against "any person
who shall be selling, giving, or otherwise disposing of to another,
contrary to the provision of law, any liquors or beverages, causing
the intoxication of such person for all damages actually sustained,
as well as exemplary damages." 2 Since furnishing liquor to minors is unlawful in Alabama" - indeed, as it is in all states plaintiffs suing under the dram shop law have a valid cause of action against social hosts who furnish liquor to minors, explicitly
granted in the statutory language.
Maine also adopted an unambiguous statute requiring little
construction which provides a cause of action against social
hosts." The relevant provisions make anyone who negligently or
recklessly serves liquor to a minor liable for damages proximately
caused by that minor's consumption of the liquor.16 Such simple,
categorical language prevents ambiguity and confusion regarding
an available civil remedy or duty owed. Thus, judicial debate over
application of this statute should focus on which facts show negligence or recklessness, rather than on confusion as to its scope.
Georgia codified its supreme court holding in Sutter v. Hutchings, 66 in which the court recognized social host liability. The
court stated that any social host who furnished alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated person under legal drinking age, knowing that
such person would soon be driving his car, could be liable in tort to
a third person injured by the negligence of the intoxicated driver.'67
In all, four states discovered a civil cause of action under the language of their liquor control statutes. Illinois, however, could not
adopt social host liability by direct statutory authority since the
language of the Illinois Dram Shop Act addresses only commercial,
licensed sellers of alcoholic beverages.'
M

B. No Bar or Pre-emption by Dram Shop Laws
Some courts could find no explicit civil remedy authorized by

161.
162.
163.
164.

Martin v. Watts, 513 So. 2d 958, 963 (Ala. 1987).
AL. CODE, § 6-5-71(a) (1975).
AL. CODE, § 28-3A-2(18) (1975), repealed by Acts 1986, No. 86-212.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 2501 (West 1994).

165. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, §§ 2506(1), 2507(1) (West 1994).
166. 327 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1985). Sutter held that a social hostess who furnished alcohol to noticeably intoxicated underage person knowing that he
would soon be driving could be liable. Id. at 719. GA.' CODE ANN. § 51-1-40(b)
(1988) codified the Sutter holding.

167. Sutter, 327 S.E.2d at 719.
168. See supra note 3 for the relevant text of Illinois' Dram Shop Act, 235
ILCS 5/6-21(a).
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their dram shop or liquor control laws, but saw no reason why
such laws should bar or pre-empt a negligence action against social
hosts. 6' Iowa is a good example. That state supreme court, in
Bauer v. Dann, held that Iowa's Dram Shop Act does not pre-empt
common law action unless the statute specifically covers the particular defendant.170
Thus, a statute directed toward licensed
commercial sellers of alcohol did not cover social hosts.17' Further,
the court held that another statute which provides that no person
shall "sell, give, or otherwise supply" liquor or beer
72 to any person
under legal drinking age did apply to social hosts.
Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, and Vermont also adopted this position--eight states in
all. 73 Illinois' Dram Shop Act reads much like Iowa's; it addresses
licensed commercial sellers of alcohol. 7 1 Illinois should join these
eight states and recognize social host civil liability since the language of Illinois' Dram Shop Act does not bar or pre-empt such an
action.
C. Violation of Statute as Evidence of Negligence
Other states view violations of statutes which prohibit furnishing alcohol to minors as evidence of negligence. 7' The relative
weight of this evidence varies from mere circumstantial evidence 17
to per se negligence, 7 7 requiring only a showing of proximate cause
to establish liability.'78 This relative weight is simply the weight

169. See supra note 158 for a list of a states who found civil causes of action
as exceptions from the statutory language (not barred or pre-empted), and
summarizing their holdings.
170. Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1988).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra note 157 for the citations of the leading cases from each of
the eight states which held that dram shop statutes did not bar or pre-empt
common law civil action.
174. See supra note 3 for the relevant text of Illinois' dram shop statute.
175. These states are: Indiana, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, and Washington. See supra note 158 for
"per se" jurisdiction citations. See supra note 159 for Indiana's leading case,
holding that violation of statute is prima facie evidence of negligence. See supra note 160 for "mere circumstantial evidence" jurisdiction citations.
176. See supra note 160 for a discussion of the leading cases from these
"mere circumstantial evidence" states.
177. See supra note 158 for a discussion of the leading cases from these "per
se" states.
178. The three relative weights to which courts attribute evidence of statutory violations when determining negligence actions are: mere evidence,
prima facie evidence, and per se evidence. In mere evidence jurisdictions,
violation of statute is just one piece of evidence for the trier of fact to consider
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that each state assigns to violation of statute in assessing negligence generally.
Three states - Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin - view

violation of statutes which prohibit furnishing alcohol to minors as
per se negligence. 7 ' In Brattainv. Hermon., the Indiana Appellate
Court held that any person, including a social provider, who violates a statute which prohibits giving liquor to minors can be
civilly liable for negligence. 8 ° Pennsylvania's and Wisconsin's
rulings were substantially the same.
Michigan's Supreme Court considers violation of its liquor
control act prima facie evidence of negligence. In Longstreth v.
Gensel, the court construed the section which prohibited any person from furnishing liquor to underage persons to apply not only to
licensed sellers but to all persons.'8' Four states - Montana, New
Hampshire, New York, and Washington - view violation of liquor
control statutes as mere evidence of negligence, to be considered
along with all other evidence.' 82 Thus, in a common law action for
negligence, a defendant's violation of a statute which prohibits
giving alcohol to minors is evidence that such defendant failed to
act as a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would have under
the same circumstances.
In Hansen v. Friend,"3 the Supreme Court of Washington held
that a criminal penalty in a liquor control statute imposes a duty
of care on social hosts to refrain from serving alcohol to minors." '
The statute penalized "any person" who furnished alcohol to minors. 8' New York took the same position in Montgomery v. Orr,
specifically holding that minors, by reason of their immaturity, are
not "able-bodied" within the meaning of the general rule at common law excluding liability for furnishing of intoxicating liquor to
able-bodied individuals. 8 6 Illinois generally views violation of a
statute as evidence of negligence.'87 It should cease viewing the
in a negligence action. In a prima facie jurisdiction, this statutory violation
would constitute competent evidence of carelessness. In a per se jurisdiction,
the plaintiff need only show proximate causation to establish liability.
179. See supra note 158 for summaries of the holdings of the leading cases
in these three states.
180. 309 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
181. See supra note 159 for a discussion of the Longstreth case.
182. See supra note 160 for a discussion of the holdings of the leading cases
in these four "mere evidence" states.
183. 824 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1992).
184. Id. at 486.
185. Id.
186. See supra note 160 for a discussion of the Montgomery holding.
187. Seee.g., Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., 581 N.E.2d 656
(Ill. 1991); Batteast v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 560 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 1990); Barthel v.
Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 384 N.E.2d 323 (111. 1978); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.,
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Liquor Control Act as an exception to this rule. Further, Illinois
should recognize, as New York explicitly did, that minors are not
the same as "able-bodied" adults in most areas of the law, and alcohol-related liability should be treated no differently.
D. Common Law Negligence Action
Finally, some states view the furnishing of alcohol to minors
as just another incidence of common law negligence. 8 The reasonable social host of ordinary prudence knows, or should know,
that harm is likely to result from serving alcohol to minors, these
state supreme courts contend.
Ohio's rule could scarcely be simpler: a social host has a duty
to refrain from serving alcohol to a minor and may be civilly liable
for damages to third persons injured in an automobile accident involving such minor if that duty is violated." 9 Delaware concurs
with this holding, but states the duty in a slightly more affirmative
manner: a social host's failure to take reasonable steps to safeguard against indulgence by minors in alcoholic beverages and operation of motor vehicles by such minors in impaired condition is
actionable negligence.'9 ' Two states went much further and extended the scope of liability for social hosts to harm resulting from
any guest which the host should reasonably have known was intoxicated.'9' This rule puts social hosts on equal footing with dram
shops, with the exception that all dram shops will be held to a certain level of expertise, by law, based on their licensing requirements.
New Jersey social hosts who know or should know that the
guest is both intoxicated and that he will thereafter be operating a
motor vehicle must refrain from serving such guest.192 Otherwise,
the host will be liable for injuries inflicted on a third party as a re117 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. 1954); Martin v. Ortho Pharm., 645 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) rev'd on other grounds in 661 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 1996); Blankenship v.
Peoria Park Dist., 647 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Filipetto v. Village of
Wilmette, 627 N.E.2d 60 (M11.
App. Ct. 1993). Each of these courts held that
violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation designed for protection of life or
property is prima facie evidence of negligence, and that a party injured by
such violation has a cause of action, provided that he or she falls within class
intended to be protected, and injury suffered is a direct and proximate result
of violation.
188. See supra note 161 summarizing the holdings of cases in the six states
which view furnishing alcohol to minors as negligence at common law.
189. Misteffv. Wheeler, 526 N.E.2d 798, 800 (Ohio 1988).
190. DiOssi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1988).
191. McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141 (Mass.
1986); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
192. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1224.
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sult of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle if the negligence
is caused by the intoxication.'93 The rule in Massachusetts is
similar, but slightly broader yet since the social host need not
know that the guest will thereafter be driving. Simply permitting
a guest to take a drink when the host knows or should reasonably
know that such guest is drunk triggers liability to persons injured
by that guest's negligent operation of a motor vehicle."
As previously discussed, furnishing alcohol to a minor with
the knowledge that such minor will soon operate a motor vehicle is
negligence under any conventional test."' Thus, under a common
law negligence analysis, Illinois should recognize social host liability for the harm resulting from the acts of intoxicated minor
guests. Consumption of alcohol does not break the chain of proximate causation from the provider of the alcohol, when the one who
consumes it is not deemed responsible for his actions. Minors are
one such protected class in Illinois, and should be recognized as
such.
These twenty-seven states have traveled four paths of legal
analysis to arrive at the same destination: social hosts should be
liable for the tortious acts of minor guests when the hosts provide
the alcohol which leads to such minors' intoxication. Justice
McMorrow followed three of these paths in Cravens v. Inman, and
demonstrated the validity of this cause of action under Illinois
law.' 9 The Illinois Supreme Court ignored what a majority of
these United States then recognized when it blocked off the paths
to justice in Charles v. Seigfried.97

193. Id.
194. McGuiggan, 496 N.E.2d at 146.
195. See supra notes 134-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
bases for liability under a common law negligence analysis. See Cravens v.
Inman, 586 N.E.2d 367 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
196. Id. at 376-80.
197. Charles v. Seigfried, 623 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). On October 18, 1995, a Texas appellate court came down with essentially the same
holding on essentially the same facts as the court in Cravens v. Inman, 586
N.E.2d 367. Texas thus now faces the same situation that Illinois faced in
Charles. In Ryan v. Friesenhahn,911 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), a 17
year old girl died in a single car crash as a result of her intoxication. She received her alcohol from a social host at a party. The Texas court held that the
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code, TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.06 (West
1995), which prohibits furnishing alcohol to minors, applied to social hosts,
and was evidence of negligence per se. It also held that a common law negligence action was appropriate under the circumstances, following the same
train of argument as this Comment. Id.
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
Illinois should adopt social host liability upon limited facts.
Where a social host knowingly or recklessly serves alcoholic beverages to a minor who as a result becomes intoxicated, that social
host should be liable for any harm caused as a result of the minor's
intoxication.
General social host liability which parallels that of dram
shops is too broad. It relieves adult drinkers of the responsibility
for their actions, and requires social hosts to police their parties as
professional establishments do. No tenable legal argument, however, supports this total ban against social host liability where minors are served to the point of intoxication and they subsequently
cause harm as a result of such intoxication. The choice to drink
alcohol is not one Illinois law permits minors to make; thus, it is
not their choice, but the choice of the social host. A minor's act of
drinking, or even drinking and driving and crashing, does not
break the chain of proximate causation because such acts are foreseeable by a reasonable social host.
Social hosts have a duty, at either common law or defined by
statute, to refrain from serving alcohol to minors. If a social host
breaches that duty and harm results proximately from such
breach, that host should be liable.

